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COMMENTS
WHEN IS A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC
INTEREST?
When is a business affected with a public interest, so as to be-
come what is called a public calling, and to be subject to the
public calling obligations: to serve all of the class of service, with
reasonably adequate facilities, for reasonable compensation and
without discrimination? What is the test of public calling?
In the early Strict Period in Anglo-American law, all busi-
nesses were common callings. The thing which made a calling
common was the fact that it was pursued as a business, and not
occassionally by special agreement, or as a casual act., Even
at this early date all common callings were bound to two obliga-
tions at least: to perform their service in a workmanlike man-
ner after entering upon performance, and to serve all who
applied.
The obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner was not
peculiar to public callings. Anyone who undertook to perform
for another was liable to the latter in an action on the case,
or in special assumpsit, if he relied upon the undertaking to his
injury. This law still survives in modern law in cases of
gratuitous promises to convey land, to grant a license, to make
a charitable subscription and to make other gifts, gratuitous
undertakings of bailees, and waivers; where, upon the principle
of promissory estoppel, promisors are held liable on their prom-
ises though not supported by any consideration under the bar-
gain theory.2 The distinction between the common callings and
ordinary cases was this, that in ordinary cases parties could
not be held liable without an express special assumpsit, while
common callings could be held without laying an assumpsit,
on the allegation that they were common callings.3
The obligation to serve everyone arose either as a result of the
implied general assumpsit from the holding out to serve4 or as
I Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 152, 158; Burdick,
Origin of Public Service Duties, 11 Col. L. Rev. 514, 522; Arterburn, Origin
and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 411, 419.
2American Law Institute, Contracts Restatement, Sec. 88, and Commen-
tary, Sec. 88.
3 Holmes, The Common Law, 184.
4Burdick, Origin of Public Service Duties, 11 Col. L. Rev. 522.
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a result of affirmative legislation imposing for economic reasons
such obligation upon all those in common callings.5 The obli-
gation did not arise as a result of monopoly, although monopoly
conditions undoubtedly generally prevailed in common callings
at this time.
In the Period of Equity, or soon thereafter, when the num-
ber of businesses had greatly increased, a division between pub-
lic and private arose; the law of common callings became a
law of public callings--that is callings subject to the control
of the state as distinguished from those that were followed as
a business; the obligations to serve for reasonable compensation
and to furnish reasonably adequate facilities arose; and the law
of public callings, largely due to the influence of Lord Hale,
was apparently placed on the basis of virtual monopoly.6 How-
ever, it has been suggested that the public control of this period
should be explained on the theory of public grant of franchises,
power of eminent domain, exclusive privileges, or financial aid
upon condition of public service. 7
In the Period of Maturity the law of public callings retired to
the background and was largely supplanted by the new doctrines
of freedom of contract, laissez faire, competition and indi-
vidualism.8
With the modern Period of Socialization the law of public
callings was again revived, and in the United States especially
has had remarkable development. Herein only the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court will be traced.
In the case of Munn v. IllinoisO the Supreme Court held that
the grain elevators of Chicago were affected with a public in-
terest so as to make their charges subject to regulation, because
of virtual monopoly in a business where the owners were in a
5 Arterburn, Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. of Pa. Law
Rev. 420.
6 Hale (1609-1676) De Jure Marls, 1 Harg. Tracts 6; Hale, De Portibus
Marls, 1 Harg Tracts 78; Allnut v. Inglis (1810), 12 East 527; Bremner v.
Williams (1824), 1 C. & P. 414.
7 Burdick, Origin of Public Service Duties, 11 Col. L. Rev. 529, 755;
Tyson v. Banton, 47 Sup. Ct. 431. In the United States, with the doctrine
of due process of law which obtains here, grants of privileges, franchises,
power of eminent domain, and financial aid can hardly be a basis for putting
a business into a public calling, for a business would have to be a public
calling so as to give a public purpose for taxation or public use for eminent
domain before such grants would be legal-17 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 222.
8 Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law, 117.
9 (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
position to impose a common charge. Lord Hale's test of virtual
monopoly consequently was adopted but perhaps with a slight
modification.
In the case of Budd v. New York l another grain elevator case,
the United States Supreme Court apparently made the test of
public calling what looks like a series of operative facts-the
nature and extent of the business, the existence of virtual
monopoly, the fact that the business was rendered possible only
by a canal built and maintained at public expense, the interest
to trade and commerce, the relation of the business to the pros-
perity and welfare of the state, and the practice of legislation
in analogous cases. Here the test of virtual monopoly was modi-
fied by other things which might be called matters of importance
to the public, and historical considerations.
In Brass v. North Dakota1" the Supreme Court held the grain
elevators in North Dakota to be public callings, where there was
no monopoly, upon the ground of legislative declaration. Here
the Supreme Court almost abandoned the test of virtual monop-
oly and went back to what perhaps was the origin of the public
calling obligations,-legislative declaration. The opinion cer-
tainly denuded the test of public calling, at least for the time be-
ing, of the idea that there must be virtual monopoly to have a
business affected with a public interest.
10 (1892) 143 U. S. 517, affirming People v. Budd (1889), 117 N. Y. 1.
Justice Andrews in the New York case also clearly states that his decision
does not rest on the basis that control is a survival, or on the basis of special
privileges conferred.
11 (1894) 153 U. S. 391.
Brass v. Stoezer is the high water mark of the doctrine of legislative
declaration in the law of public callings. However as high a mark in state
declaration was reached in the law of taxation in the case of Green v.
Frazier, (1920) 253 U. S. 233. The United States Supreme Court is not
liable again to give so much weight to mere legislative or state declarations.
Nevertheless, the initiation of action along the line of subjecting individual
liberty to social control will continue to lie with the legislatures. The
Supreme Court will continue only to apply the breaks when it thinks legis-
lation is moving too fast. At first legislative labels were rather freely
permitted when the attempt was merely to enlarge the catagory of common
carriers. In this way telegraph companies, telephone companies and pipe
line companies [The Pipe Line Cases, (1914) 234 U. S. 548] became com-
mon carriers and public callings, but in the case of common carriers the
Supreme Court finally took the position that a private carrier could not be
made a common carrier by mere legislative fiat, but that the individual
must devote himself to common carriage before he can be made a common
carrier. Frost v. Railroad Commission, (1926) 271 U. S. 583. If new
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In German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (Kansas) 12the Supreme
Court held the business of fire insurance to be a public calling
because of its peculiar relation to the public due to the indis-
pensable nature, or. the practical necessity, of the business of
fire insurance to the public, together with the monopolistic char-
acter of the business found in the absence of liberty of contract
in the fixing of the price of insurance, and not because of special
privileges conferred; but it did not overrule the case of Brass
v. North Dakota. The test here was a twofold test of indis-
pensable service and virtual monopoly (something as in the case
of People v. Budd).
In Block v. Hirsh13 the Supreme Court held that the business
of housing at least in times of emergency, is a public calling
with the obligation to serve a class, for reasonable compensa-
tion, on the ground of monopoly in a necessary of life. This is
another case which seems to adopt a twofold test of monopoly
and indispensable service, or practical necessity.
In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,14 the Su-
preme Court, while declining to decide whether all the businesses
declared to be affected with a public interest by the Kansas In-
dustrial Court Act were so affected, because even so they could
not be regulated so as to compel continuity of the business,15
held that a business can not be made affected with a public in-
terest by legislative declaration51O--thereby indirectly overruling
Brass v. North Dakota--but that to be affected with a public
interest a business must either (1) be carried on under a grant
of privileges which expressly or impliedly imposes the affirma-
tive duty of rendering a public service, or (2) be an occupation
which has survived the period when all trades and callings were
regulated, or (3) have a peculiar relation to the public because
businesses are to be made public callings hereafter it evidently must be
outside of common carriers. With the approval that housing legislation
received development in this field seemed very imminent, but with the club-
bing the Kansas Industrial Court Act and the New York Theatre legisla-
tion received the development seems more remote. When the Supreme
Court is conservative it relies upon the analytical and historical processes;
when it is progressive, upon the philosophical process. It would seem that
all three processes should be invoked in every case.
12 (1914) 233 U. S. 389.
13 (1921) 256 U. S. 135.
.' (1922) 262 U. S. 522.
15 Yet the Supreme Court held that this could be done in the case of
Wilson v. New, (1917) 243 U. S. 332.
15a Washington v. Kuykendall, 48 Sup. Ct. 41.
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of the indispensable nature of its service and the exorbitant
charges and arbitrary control to which it might subject the
public. The third part of this test can be assimilated to the
test adopted in prior decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.16 The second part of the test rests upon the common
ground of historical precedent but can affect no new cases.
The first part of the test has been suggested before, but as
already pointed out has the difficulty in the United States that
the grant of privileges itself must run the gauntlet of the due
process clause before it can be the basis of any public calling obli-
gations,17 and we may have to reserve our doubts about it until
the Supreme Court declares some new business affected with a
public interest solely on the ground of a grant of privileges.
Hence, the test of public callings adopted by this case which is
of practical importance is the third part of the test.
With the law in this state of uncertainty it was hoped that
when the case of Tyson v. Banton18 came before it the Supreme
Court would clear up all uncertainties and give us a final answer
to the question of when a business becomes affected with a public
interest, but we were doomed to disappointment. The case, as
interpreted by the majority, involved the question of whether or
not amusements were sufficiently clothed with a public interest
to justify the regulation of the maxim prices of admission. The
Court repeated that a business cannot be affected with a public
interest by mere legislative declaration, and adopted the three-
fold test of Wolff v. Industrial Court as to what would make a
business affected with a public interest. The Court then found
that the instant case, like the Wolff case, came under the third
part of the test if at all, because there was no grant of privileges
and no sufficient historical precedent; and was of the opinion
that the business in this case did not come under the third part
of the test, apparently because a theater does not render an in-
dispensable service but is a private enterprise. Four justices
dissented. Justices Holmes and Brandeis were ready to throw
away judicial tests and leave the matter to legislative discretion
as in Brass v. North Dakota. Justices Stone and Sanford were
of the opinion that the conditions were sufficiently monopolistic
and sufficiently essential to life to justify regulation.
16People v. Budd, supra; German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis,
supra; Block v. Hirsh, supra.
1T Note 7.
18 (1927) 47 Sup. Ct. 426.
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The decision again enthrones the doctrine of judicial su-
premacy, but it still leaves somewhat vague the judicial test as
to when a business is affected with a public interest. Public
interest control seems to be a penalty for unrighteous economic
conduct. Is there any economic pattern into which public in-
terest enterprises can be fitted? Can we delimit the field of
business activity? Are Giant Power, the coal industry and the
steel industry affected with a public interest? Are other trusts
and monopolies public callings?
Will entertainment never be regarded as an indispensable
service? All we can now with safety say is that in order to be
affected with a public interest there must be a peculiarly close
relation between the business and the public and that such close
relation is found where there is virtual monopoly in an indis-
pensable service. But when do we have a virtual monopoly and
when do we have an indispensable service? Tyson v. Banton
shows us that we are just embarking on an uncharted sea so
far as concerns these questions.")
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS.
Indiana University School of Law.
19 It has also been suggested that price regulation is broader than the
law of public callings, and that this broader price regulation is just as much
due process of law as is the regulation of public callings and for the same
reasons: (1) English practice prior to the adoption of our Constitution,
and (2) police power. Rottschaeffer, Field of Governmental Price Control,
35 Yale L. J. 438; Isaacs' The Revival of the Justum Pretium, 6 Cornell L.
Q. 38. But see Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, (1927) 47 Sup. Ct.
506.
